Grant vs. Lee
Monument to the Solders of Massachusetts.
Union
Lt Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, U. S. Army – Headquarters City Point
Gen Meade, Army of the Potomac
Confederate
Gen. Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army of Virginia - Richmond
The Siege
General Grant initiated the battle for Petersburg as a part of his strategy for the conquest of Richmond. Richmond was the capital of the Confederacy and as such was key to the conquest of the South and ending the Civil War. Petersburg was the rail hub where supplies arrived for both cities and was therefore the key to isolating and capturing Richmond.
Like any siege, the key to victory for either side at Petersburg was supply. Entrenched troops are nearly invulnerable to attack as long as they are supplied with bullets, beans and the occasional replacement. Both sides of the line at Petersburg were well dug in as they faced each other, as can be seen in the historical pictures below. A fortified trench multiplies the defenders strength by a factor of five and for the rebels this was the key to their continued survival. The key to breaking a fortified siege line is to cut its supply lines. Once the supplys stop flowing the collapse of the defense is only a matter of time.
As can be see from my first two paragraphs, Petersburg was a ring of keys waiting for someone, Grant, to snatch them. For the rank and file soldier, the ten month struggle in the trenches before both cities was series of attacks, retreats, and retrenching, with long periods of dirt, death and boredom in between. Keys be damned.
The Civil War has given rise to many myths, one of which is that Grant had a numerical superiority of 3-5 to 1 in the trenches before Petersburg. Grant did end up with a 3 to 1 superiority at Appomattox but that was after Lee’s defeat Sailor’s Creek where he lost half of his army. For most of the siege Grant only had a slight advantage in numbers, certainly less than 2 to 1. That is why the siege drug on for ten months.
The battle for Petersburg and Richmond was decided outside the trenches, in the battle of supplys. Both Lee and Grant understood that both cities city would fall without a steady stream of supplies. Lee had warned the Confederate Government many times that he would not be able to defend them once the railroads were lost. Grant was quickly able to cut all of the rail lines except the South Side Railroad. While the two armies faced each other from their trenches the respective cavalries dueled on the south and east sides of Richmond as Grant tried to cut the last rail link with the rest of the South. The effect was to grow the trench lines ever longer. This was not a game Lee could play indefinitely. The North had been successful on a number of fronts against confederate forces and with every victory Grant could concentrate more troops on the Petersburg front. Lee on the other hand was fighting a come as you are engagement, every man he lost was irreplaceable and every mile the line was extended weakened the rest of the line for the Confederates a little bit more.
As I stated earlier, Grant didn't have a huge advantage in numbers, but he didn't need one. As the defender, Lee had to man the whole line because he never knew where Grant might strike. While Grant could concentrate and attack where he might choose and didn't need to worry about any attack Lee might make. The 5 to 1 defense advantage works for both sides. Fort Stedman, see bellow, is a good example of Grants advantge and how it worked. Lee concentrated as much of his forces as he could and attacked a weak point in the Union line. Grant was attending a review of the troops at City Point when Lee launched his attack. Grant didn't leave City Point when he got word of the attack, he didn't even cancle the review and rush the troops forward to stem the tide of the assualt. The local commander stopped the Confederate attack and recaptured Fort Stedman with the troops he had on hand. Lee's last great assualt was brushed off like one might shoo off a fly.
Grants Target: The Southside Railroad
Fords Depot South Side Railroad, west of Petersburg.
(Tour Stop 1) City Point Railroad near Battery 5.
The Weldon Railroad at Reams Station.
When the battle opened there were five railroads into Petersburg:
The Petersburg and Weldon Railroad was cut in August by the Union shortly after the siege started. Supplies brought in by that railroad had to be hauled by wagon the last sixteen miles into the city limiting its usefulness to the South.
The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad moved troops and supplies between the two cities but was of limited use because it only had one track and was in range of Union artillery.
The Richmond and Danville Railroad was of limited use because supplies coming in from the south had to be unloaded at Danville on the North Caroline/Virginia boarder and then reloaded on the Richmond train because the lines were constructed with different gages.
The City Point Railroad was in Union hands from the beginning of the siege and was used by Grants army to bring supplies up to the front from the James.
The most important line was the South Side Railroad. It was the life line that kept the Southern troops manning the Petersburg trenches in bullets and beans. The line ran east along the Appomattox River and was a double track line allowing trains to run simultaneously in both directions. All of Grants maneuverings and strategies during the siege revolved around shutting down the South Side Line.
At Five Forks, Grant’s combined force of cavalry under Sherman and infantry under Warren finally achieved the 5 to 1 advantage necessary to break the confederate line and threaten the South Side Railroad. The victory combined with a general attack along the rest of the line and breakthroughs at what is now known as the Pamplin Historical Park forced Lee to evacuate both Petersburg and Richmond in a vain attempt to join forces with General Johnston in the west. Lee’s retreat generally followed the South Side Railroad to Appomattox Courthouse.
The First Casualties of the Siege
(Tour Stop 1) The ruins of the Josiah Jordan house. Only the foundation remains. It can be see near the Eastern Front Visitors Center along the path to Battery 5.
(Tour Stop 7) The ruins of the Taylor House are located between Fort Morton and the Crater, these ruins are all that remain of the Taylor Plantation and are built on the site of the original slaves quarters. The farm was abandoned during the siege.
These ruins remind us that wars and battle effect more than armies, generals and solders, they change the nature of everything they touch. The Eastern Front battlefield is a beautiful wooded land with grassy clearings and meadows. This was not the way it looked in 1864. Massive earthworks, forts and trenches, stretched from Battery 1 on the Appomattox River north of Petersburg to Battery 55 also on the Appomattox at Rohoic Creek south of the city. In 1864 the trees were chopped down to build the works and clear the fields of fire for the defenders. The entire ten mile strip of land became a barren wasteland with no room for a couple of farmers.
A view of the Petersburg Battlefield taken from an observation tower. Note the deforestation and barron landscape.
Battery 5
(Tour Stop 1) Battery 5 note the moat at the base of fortress, this system of multiple lines is known as defense in depth. Infantry troops driven out of the lower trench retreat into the fort and fire down into the moat turning it into a killing field. This is better seen in the Battery 9 pictures.
Union troops in a captured Confederate fort. Note the barren approach and the foward trench that can be see from center right of the photo running to middle top. Defense in depth.
(Tour Stop 1) Another view of the trench line in front of Battery 5 the fortress walls can just be seen on the right.
Battery 5 was the strongest fortress built on the original Confederate line. It fell to Union attackers in half an hour on June 15, 1864 on the opening day of the battle. At the time of the fall there were no significant troop or defenses between the Union forces and Petersburg, all they had to do was stroll into the city and raise a flag to end the siege before it started, but the Union commander General William F. Smith decide his boys had done enough for one day and stopped. They had done a lot, all right, capturing a mile and a half of trench, five forts with sixteen guns, but General Hancock was coming up behind him in support and there was nothing to stop Smith from taking the city. Except Smith who was tried. During the night Lee was able to bring up 7,000 troops and build a new line of defense behind Harrison’s Creek. The rankers knew stopping was a mistake and let up a howl, but Smith had gone to bed.
Even with the reinforcments brought up by the Confederates the Union still possessed a 5 to 1 superiority and should have been able to advance, break the new line, and take Petersburg. Grant ordered a fresh assault on the Confederate positions and assaults were launched, but some how they were never coordinated or effective. Commands were muddled and contradictory, generals argued about who was in charge: Lee was given twenty four hours to continue to reinforce and he the time to do just that. The result was a ten month siege.
(Tour Stop 1) Inside Battery 5 the trees were not there during the siege.
(Tour Stop 1) Over the cannon view in Battery 5.
(Tour Stop 1) Battery 5 cannon.
(Tour Stop 1) Battery five from the attackers point of view.
(Tour Stop 1) Battery five from the attackers point of view.
(Tour Stop 1) Battery five from the attackers point of view.
The Dictator
(Tour Stop 1) Armies have always been fascinated with big guns that have no real impact on the course of the war. I do not know why that is.
(Tour Stop 1) The Dictator’s magazine. Big guns require a lot support and infrastructure to operate, in the end they never seem to contribute much to the final outcome.
Photo of an actual magazine.
Battery 8
(Tour Stop 2) Battery 8, like Battery 5, started life as a Confederate Strong point but was captured by Union troops and turned into a Union Fort. The Fort was renamed Fort Friend after another farm nearby that was displaced by the siege. War is hard on farmers.
Battery 9
(Tour Stop 3) Battery 9, seen as you drive up, demonstrates what an attacker sees as they approach.
(Tour Stop 3) Same fort seen from the defenders viewpoint, note the bombproof bunker in the middle.
(Tour Stop 3) Close up of Civil War “razor wire” and the moat the attackers had to cross.
(Tour Stop 3) The amount of wood required to build one of these batteries, forts, or strong points shows why there were no woods left when the siege started.
A picture from Fort Sidgwick showing how the ines were laid out.
The camp for the black troops. Note that the trees in the camp itself were left while all of he surronding trees were cut down.
Other sights in the vicinity of Battery 9
(Tour Stop 3) This monument was placed at this location because it was black troops who took Batteries 8 & 9 on the opening day of the siege.
(Tour Stop 3) Prince George Courthouse Road leads to Meade Station where Union supplies brought up by rail from City Point were unloaded for the front.
(Tour Stop 3) This small section of track represents where Meade Station use to be. There are several things about this track I find interesting, one is how low the rail profile is. They seem tiny by today’s standards. Second is their width, they are so far apart. I stood over them for quite some time trying to decide if they really were set as wide as they look or if it was an optical illusion. I finally decided they are set to a very wide gage.
City Point where Grant's railroad started.
Grant's Headquarters at City Point.
(Tour Stop 3) Called the Meade Station Road, it runs back toward Battery 5 off Prince George Courthouse Road.
Harrison Creek
(Tour Stop 4) Harrison Creek
Harrison Creek divides the Eastern Front in half. Driven from their positions during the first day’s battle the Confederates fell back across the creek and dug in along the western bank. They held this position for two days before falling back into a newly constructed line which they held for the remainder of the siege. When the Confederates drove the Union out of their lines in an attack on Fort Stedman on March 25, 1865 the Union forces used Harrison Creek as a temporary fortification to rally behind and stop the Confederate advance, and it was from here they launched their counter attack to retake the fort.
(Tour Stop 4) The rugged landscape demonstrates Harrison Creeks usefulness as a defensive position.
(Tour Stop 4)
Fort Stedman
(Tour Stop 5)
While the most famous incident on the Easter Front is the explosion of the mine dug by solders of the 48th Pennsylvania due to the movie Cold Mountain, the real event that decided the issue of who was going to win the war of the trenches was the battle for Fort Stedman. Here, on March 25, 1865 Lee attempted to break the Union lines and throw them back away from the city. The attack was launched from a position known as Colquitt’s Salient. Note: a strong point in the line that the Union called a fort the Confederates called a salient. The definition of a slient is a bulge in the line. When the bulge extends out toward the enemy, it become vulnerable to attack from three sides.
Lee, seeing the strategic weakness in the Union position at Fort Stedman, scraped together everyone he could find to launch an attack. It was his last offensive assault. After the Confederate repulse at Stedman Lee would stay on the defensive and never again mount an attack. The fight for Fort Stedman is an excellent example of the intrinsic problem with launching an offensive in trench warfare.
Lee pioneered trench warfare during the Civil War. More than anyone he understood the power of the rifled musket and how it would change the way battles would be fought. Only forty nine years earlier the Revolutionary War had been fought by solders standing in straight lines in open fields firing smooth bore muskets. Lee had had an opportunity to see the effect of the modern musket as an officer with the American forces in the Mexican War. Initially, before the victories that made his reputation, Lee was derisively called Granny Lee by the Confederate troops because of his penchant for digging in. If you really look at his battles, Lee made sure to always get there first, reinforce a position and let the Union attack him. Gettysburg was the one place where the Union beat him to the battlefield, dug in first, and he attacked them. Lee’s army never recovered from the losses of that attack.
What Lee could not know, was the lesson that would be learned later in World War I, an army driven back from its position gets stronger as it falls back upon supplies and reinforcements while the attacker grows weaker as they get further away from their base of supplies. That is the secret of trench warfare, and it remained that way until the development of the modern tank and platoon level tactics.
Yes, they surprised and captured Fort Stedman, for a little while anyway, but they couldn't hold it.
(Tour Stop 5) As an army falls back it is falling back on supplies and reinforcements, the attackers are moving away from both and losing solders as they go so they progressively weaker.
(Tour Stop 5) Inside Fort Stedman.
(Tour Stop 5) To the right is Colquitt’s Salient. The Colquitt monument is above right under the trees by the path.
(Tour Stop 5) This cannon is several hundred yards out in front, facing the fort.
(Tour Stop 5) Fort Stedman as the attackers saw it.
Colquitt’s Salient
As mentioned in the monument above the was an attack launched by the Union of Colquitt’s Salient from Fort Stedman on June 18th 1864 by the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery. It did not succeed, the Maine regiment sustained the heaviest casualties of any regiment in the entire Civil War. This monument pictured bellow was erected to commemorate the event.
(Tour Stop 5) Monument to the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery.
(Tour Stop 5) Relic from a bygone tour rout. Thanks Randy.
(Tour Stop 5.5) The view of Fort Stedman from Union Battery XI which fired in support of the Union defense. The trench line can be clearly seen.
(Tour Stop 5.5) Union Battery XI looking toward Fort Haskell with can be seen in the distance. The picture shows the Union trenches.
Fort Haskell
(Tour Stop 6) Fort Haskell was the position that the Union troops south of Fort Stedman fell back upon during the assault of March 25, 1865 and it was here they checked the Confederate advance.
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(Tour Stop 6) The view of the Confederate advance from inside Fort Haskell. The Union solders were firing over this wall. This shot is looking toward Fort Steadman.
(Tour Stop 6) The Fort Haskell was heavily defended with troops and cannon.
This is an example of what I mean by the conundrum of the attack. The Union troop driven from their positions fell back into Fort Haskell on this side or Harrison Creek on the other. The troops falling back to Harrison Creek met the troops advancing to counter attack while the troops retreating into Fort Haskell reinforced the defenders already there. Meanwhile, the confederates were taking casualties and growing weaker with every foot of advance while being spread out over an expanding area. That is always the problem inherent in trench warfare, much of the modern development of new weapons and machinery of war was to solve this problem.
Union Battery XIII
(Tour Stop 6.5)
Union Battery XIV
(Tour Stop 6.6)
Fort Morton
(Tour Stop 7) The works around Fort Morton were destroyed by repeated plowing by Mr. Taylor who returned to farming his land after the war. Turn about is fair play. The park service shows the outline of the old works by leaving the grass long.
(Tour Stop 7) Another view of Fort Morton.
The Battle of The Crater
(Tour Stop 8) The view from Fort Morton looking toward the Crater. The Crater site can be seen on the far hill between the gap in the trees.
(Tour Stop 8) The Crater site from the parking area.
U.S. Grant said of the battle of The Crater, “the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war,” and “such an opportunity for carrying fortifications I have never seen and do not expect again to have.” Meade said, “I think there will have to be an investigation.” So you ask, what happened?
During the course of the siege a solder from 48th Pennsylvania approached his regimental commander, a mining engineer, with the idea of digging a tunnel and blowing up the Confederate fort across the way from them. The 48th was made up of coal miners and had plenty of experienced diggers on hand for the task. The commander sent the idea up the line until it reached General Burnside who took it to General Meade. Meade was not impressed by the idea but said ok, it would give everyone something to do and there was nothing else going on at the time.
The solders dug their mine in relative obscurity; no one thought it would work so no one interfered. The Confederates heard the digging and dug a couple counter mines of their own but they did not think much of the idea either so they did not put much effort into the counter mining. As the 48th finished digging and started loading the mine with explosives Meade reconsidered the idea and decided to get involved.
During the digging, Burnside had a division of black troop’s offline training to storm the works after the mine was blown. They practiced rushing forward, running around the crater and reforming on the other side. Rush forward, run around the crater, reform on the otherside, white troops would follow and expand the breach. Literally the night before the attack, Meade told Burnside to change the order of attack and put white troops in first. Meade also told Burnside to have the front line cleared of obstacles to prepare the way for the attack.
Burnside was so furious that he had been usurped by Meade, that he forgot all about clearing a path through his own works, called his division commanders together and had them draw straws to see who would lead the attack, then washed his hands of the whole thing. The short straw fell to General James H. Ledlie, a man known to be a drunkard and a coward. Nobody questioned the wisdom of having this man in charge of an assault for such visibility even though many thought he was the worst officer in the army.
Nobody told the new troops what was going to happen or what they were suppose to do. The mine exploded, the order was given to charge and right away the troops found their way blocked by their own lines and defenses. They threaded their way through the various obstacles and reformed into a column instead of the wide front the plan called for them to attack on. They ran into the hole instead of around it and there they stopped there not knowing what they were supposed to do next. Meanwhile, General Ledlie was sitting in a dugout drinking rum and getting totally plowed.
The movie "Cold Mountain" opens with the scene of Union troops trapped in the creater, but does not explain what had happened or what had caused them to be there, it also foreshortened the event the way movies do. The Union troops blundered about for an hour before the Confederates were able to mount a response. The supporting Union troops who were still trying to make their forward were jammed up behind the lines still not know exactly what they were suppose to do. On the Confederate side General Mahone organized and personally led a counter attack. The result was a slaughter of the Union troops by Mahones men as Confederates fired down on them from the rim of the crater even as more Union troops pushed in to be slaughtered as well. More Union troops died in the retreat than in the battle of The Crater itself compounding the disaster. The black troops who were suppose to lead the attack, before Meade got involved ,went forward when they saw what was happening and tried to help out but by that time the opportunity had been lost and they died for nothing. Worse, as the attack collapsed, white troops shot down the blacks out of fear of being killed themselves if captured in their company.
The shear incompetence of the Union leadership shown in this attack is staggering. The troops did their part and did it well as they could under the circumstances. The mine worked perfectly, the Union had a full hour to advance without opposition, but no one had given any orders so the solders took cover and waited for instructions that never came. The man who should have been giving orders was drunk and Burnside who was watching the attack from Fort Morton and officially in charge did nothing. NOTHING. Burnside did the same thing when he was commander of the army at Chancellorsville, he froze while Lee made maneuvers that even he, Lee, later said were crazy. Why Burnside was still in the army is hard to understand.
Where was Meade while all this happened? Once Meade decided to get involved and ordered a change in the order of attack he assumed a level of responsibility for events and should have taken a much more active interest in the outcome. Nobody thought to clear the line of obstacles except Meade but he did not send anyone down to check that it was actually done. Grant was right, the whole thing was a sad affair.
(Tour Stop 8) The entrance to the mine. (Restored)
(Tour Stop 8)
The actual entrance to the mine. Note the two entrances.
The shaft split into two safts with what look to be eight chambers.
(Tour Stop 8) The view inside the mine: Modern and idealized.
(Tour Stop 8) Looking back down the length of the tunnel from the Union Picket Line. The mine entrance is in the trees in the center of the picture. The tunnel runs parallel to the path off to the right and is sunken so it can be seen and followed.
(Tour Stop 8)
(Tour Stop 8) The Confederate Picket Line.
(Tour Stop 8) Looking in the direction of the Union attack from the Picket Line. The tunnel opening is left of frame. Fort Morton is visible in the gap between the trees center right of frame.
(Tour Stop 8) The Crater.
(Tour Stop 8)
(Tour Stop 8) Depression caused by one of the Confederate countermines. The Confederate knew what the Yanks were doing, Grant had dug and exploded a mine at Vicksburg. Their countermine wasn't very effective, the Union had the advantage of having a whole regiment of coal miners in it's ranks.
Some of the monuments at the Crater Site
(Tour Stop 8)
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(Tour Stop 8) The crater is on top of the bank running across the picture.
(Tour Stop 8) Looking down the path of monuments at The Crater Site. The large monument in the distance is the Mahone monument.
Fort Sedgwick and Fort Mahone
These Forts lie ouside of the Eastern Front Park and is not listed as a tour stop for the easten front. I wanted to include these pictures because they show what living conditions were like for both sides in the trenches.
Troops make thing as comfortable as possible. That raises another catch-22; once you have created a good place to live, a successful attack means going back to sleeping in the mud.
On the other hand it impossible to drain a trench duging bellow ground level and foul water collects in the bottom.
There is a huge demand for trees.
Here you can see the baskets filled with dirt used to short up the sides of the trench.
Abatis: Tangled sharpended branches used to slow up attackers.
Across from Fort Sedgwick was the Rebel Fort Mahone also called Fort Damnation.
Death in the Trenches
Another problem with trenches is people die, sometimes they are blown appart, what do you do with the bodies? Especially during an attack.
(Tour Stop 8) A pile oyster shells across the road from The Crater. These shells are going to be crushed and used to mark the original crater outline. Thanks again, Randy.