The view from the top of Culp's Hill. Edmund Santini

 

It is easy to see how Lee could have woken up July 2^nd thinking he was winning a great battle at Gettysburg. Bruce Catton commented in Gettysburg: The Final Fury that the Union suffered ruinous losses on the first day and were driven from the field; but, that isn’t exactly what had happened. Buford’s cavalry troopers that had held the line on the first day and Reynolds’s infantry were only there to delay the Confederate advance until the arriving Union Army could grab the best ground: and that is exactly what they did. Yes, the Union soldiers of the first day had suffered heavy losses, but so had the Confederates, but during the Night the Union concentrated along Cemetery Ridge and was well dug in by morning. In this case it was the Union that could sit back behind fixed works and the Confederates that had to attack, unlike the previous meetings between the two armies.

Lee wanted Ewell to attack Culp’s Hill and Longstreet to hit the Union left flank at the same time to prevent Meade from shifting forces from one side to the other to meet contingences; but, Ewell was already in place when the orders were given and ready to attack, while Longstreet had to shift his entire corps from the center of the field to the far right of the Confederate position. All without tipping off the Union Army as to what was up. Longstreet dropped behind Seminary Ridge, got tangled up in the trees and didn’t have Stewart’s Cavalry available to scout the roads, so he took all morning and much of the afternoon to get into place.

Longstreet came into a great deal criticism after the war for the length of time he took to get into place. Longstreet had not wanted to attack at all and critics, mostly southerners, have tried to place the blame for Gettysburg on his shoulders by claiming he had drug his feet out of spite. There is a kind of Cult of Lee that finds Gettysburg hard to deal with and wants to explain away the loss by blaming someone else; but, it is difficult to see how Longstreet could have moved any faster. One of the roles of the Civil War cavalry was to scout the way for the infantry and to direct the way, in this case the Confederate Cavalry wasn’t there and Longstreet’s scattered corps had to blunder its way into position.

Ewell grew quickly tired of waiting so he launched his attack in the morning. The was a furious affair with Confederates trying to claw their way up Culp’s Hill in the face of an entrenched enemy. In the lore of the battle very little is said about Ewell’s attack, most of the emphasis has been on Longstreet’s attack over on the other side of the battlefield, it’s not hard to understand, Ewell’s attack really never had much of a chance. His men gained the Union line in a few places but they couldn’t hold and fell back down the hill. When the fighting stopped the Union still held the top of Culp’s Hill while Ewell’s men clung to the side a few feet away. It was a nasty situation, but one that insured a stalemate, which in this case favored the Union.

The view of Big Round Top from Warfield Ridge

 

Long about 4 pm Longstreet finally had his men in position on Warfield ridge to launch his attack. His plan had been move forward screened by the trees and hill and other such obstacles that would allow his men to get right up on the line without much loss to himself then launch an overwhelming blow against the stretched out Union left. Longstreet hoped to punch a hole through the Union position and force them into a panicked retreat. It was a good plan except that the no mans ground in front of Longstreet wasn’t empty.

 

The Attack: The Peach Orchard (Tour Stop 10) and the Wheatfield (Tour Stops 9)

 

The Peach Orchard Edmund Santini

 

While Longstreet was making his preparations Union Gen. Sickles was sitting with his troops on Little Round Top and he was bored. From his position it looked as if all of the action was going to go down a half a mile in front of him, so on his own initiative he abandoned Little Round Top, the most important position on the battlefield, and moved out in to the Slaughter Pens, the Devil’s Den, the Wheat Field and the Peach Orchard. Union troops back on the main part of the line saw the blue coats and wondered aloud what they were doing so far out front of the rest of the army. Others laughed and said not to worry, they would be back soon.

Longstreet’s attack ran into Sickles out on the plain where no one was suppose to be. The fighting quickly turned brutal. Sickles men fought with a will and made the Confederates pay dearly for every foot of ground gained. Worse for the Confederates, it was essentially useless ground, no mans land, places to be crossed on the way to somewhere else. Longstreet’s forces were eventually able to drive Sickles forces back into the main portion of the Union line but it used up the rest of the day and the strength of his attack.

Longstreet’s force was to much Sickles men to stop but they tired hard and that was enough, after driving Sickle’s men out of the Peach Orchard and the wheatfield, Longstreet's men moved into the Devil's Den where they setup sharpshooters in the rocks to plink away at the defenders on the crest of Little Roundtop while the rest of the troop’s mounted a frontal assault on summit. This kept Warren from reinforcing the Twentieth who were hanging on for dear life in their own private little corner of the war against Oats.

At the end of the day the Union launched a suicidal charge from the main part of the line to stop Longsteet's men before they could break the line. The Union line held at all points, and the Confederates gained nothing for their troubles. This set the stage for Pickett’s charge the next day.

 

The Peach Orchard Edmund Santini

 

The Peach Orchard Edmund Santini

 

The Peach Orchard Edmund Santini

 

The Peach Orchard Edmund Santini

 

The Wheat Field and the Peach Orchard

 

The Wheatfield