Vicksburg Campaign
December 26, 1862 to July 4, 1863
Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant vs. Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton
All pictures and photos for this page were taken from: http://www.civilwaralbum.com/.
The Union Order of Battle
The Confederate Order of Battle
http://www.libs.uga.edu/darchive/hargrett/maps/1861m32.jpg
Panorama Map of the Mississippi Valley and it's Fortifications
There was a chance during the summer of 1862 for the Union army to move overland from Memphis Tennessee and take Vicksburg almost unopposed. But Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck thought that the Navy could do the job by itself and didn’t take the opportunity to seize the city, only to discover that the Navy couldn’t take the city by itself: Vicksburg wasn’t called the Gibraltar of the South for nothing. The only thing the Navy’s assault actually accomplished was to tip off the Confederacy to the Unions interest in the city causing them to take a second look at their defenses and discover its vulnerability. Seeing the problem, Vicksburg was reinforced with troops and more works.
Vicksburg: River City waterfront then and now
While Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton was beginning to reinforce Vicksburg’s defenses the Navy decided to bypass the city altogether. Vicksburg was important because the city sat on steep bluffs overlooking a sharp turn in the river. Because of its commanding position, the artillery dug in on bluffs of the city controlled all shipping up and down the river. Admiral David Farragut thought he could make the city irrelevant by digging a channel across the De Soto Peninsula allowing boats to move past the guns of the city in safety. Disease and heat, two of the main Confederate allies, put a stop to Farragut’s canal and Vicksburg remained in command of the river.
Pemberton’s men continued their digging throughout Farragut’s De Soto adventure, but while the De Soto canal was a complete waist of time and effort, Pemberton’s work made the city stronger by the day. Most of the Confederate’s work was done on the landward side of the city. Reinforcement’s were brought in and the cities forces were expanded to 33,000 men behind good works, a formidable obstacle indeed.
Confederate Comand of the River
In the fall of 1862 Halleck was promoted from command of the Western Theater to command of the entire Union Army and ordered Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant to mount a campaign down the Mississippi and seize the city. Grant moved south following the Mississippi Central Railroad and captured Holly Springs with an eye toward establishing a forward siupply base to support further actions against the Vicksburg fortifications.
As I am fond of saying, most Civil War battles and Campaigns are really very simple affairs. In the Second Punic War a Carthaginian General by the name of Hannibal Barca used clever faints, maneuvers and the lay of the land to outwit a much larger Roman Army at every turn. That was not how most Civil War generals fought; they had been taught that the most aggressive force would win and the bayonet was the queen of the battlefield. This lesson had been reinforced during the Mexican Campaign when Mexican forces broke in the face of a determined bayonet charge; most of the Civil War generals from both sides had been there to see it happen. Consequently, these generals fought their battles thinking that the key to any battle was cold steel held in the hands of firm resolve. It is interesting to note that this attitude was still held by European generals in WWI.
The Vicksburg Campaign was a complicated multi-pronged affair fought on many fronts, involving cavalry raids, naval bombardments, infantry charges, massed artillery, mines, counter mines, hand grenades, trenching, canal digging, river rerouting and swamp exploration. All of this was topped off with a healthy dose of politics. In the end the primary weapon was not the bayonet, it was the shovel. The soil around Vicksburg was ideal for digging so that what both sides did, they dug.
After consolidating his position at Holly Springs Grant planned a two pronged assault against the city, first his chief lieutenant Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman would proceed down river with 32,000 men while Grant himself would continue to follow the railroad down to Oxford, Miss with another 40,000. Grants plans at this point were still nebulous; he was hoping to draw the cities defenders out for a battle in the open; mostly, Grant was playing it by ear looking for whatever opportunity that might present itself. A knowledgeable Civil War buff knows, of course, that Grant was tone deaf. Make of that what you will.
Private James Anthony's view of the fight:
On board the John Perry in the Yazoo River six miles from Vicksburg Miss June 11th 1863
Dear Wife at last we are within hearing of the guns employed in the reduction of Vicksburg. This is the sixth day since we embarked and us privates will be glad when we get on shore. James R. Anthony, Army Letters 1862-1865, Plate 145
It is now near sundown. Our boat ran back down the Yazoo and took us further down the Mississippi and landed us on the Louisiana shore in full view of Vicksburg. I am writing this in an open field about opposite and in plan sight of the city which is now being bombarded.
June twelfth We expect to move this morning to the lower landing cross over and reinforce Grants left wing. The city was shelled at intervals through the night and also this morning. We can occasionally hear the reports of small arms. We are now about three miles from the city. James R. Anthony, Army Letters 1862-1865, Plate 147
Camp near Vicksburg Mississippi June 18, 1863
I suppose the city is completely cut off from all outside assistance and must finaly fall into our hands. The Twentieth Iowa with with some five or six other regiments went out this morning to support our pickets in a further advance on the enemies lines. They made an advance of about four hundred yards without any difficulty. So you see we are hemming them in slowly but surely. Our casualties are few on our part of the lines. James R. Anthony, Army Letters 1862-1865, Plate 147
Next see: Chickasaw Bayou